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Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which 
the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP 
trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent 
per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. 
However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are 
limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-
income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European 
economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a 
major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, 
despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could 
be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor 
substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated 
with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of 
Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth 
in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Access to finance of corporations is a crucial prerequisite for growth. Beyond using existing 
cash balances, retaining profits and raising new equity, options that are typically limited 
during a recession. Borrowing can provide funds for day-to-day financial operations and 
long-term investment. 
 
In continental Europe, borrowing from banks is the dominant source of debt financing for 
non-financial corporations, and there has been little change in this during the past decade 
(Figure 1). In contrast, the share of debt securities is much higher in the United States and the 
issuance of debt securities overcompensated for the drop in bank credit from 2008 to 2013.2 
Developments in the United Kingdom are in between the euro area and the US in these 
regards, while in other EU countries, bank loans tend to dominate even more than in the euro 
area. 
 
Figure 1. Debt liabilities of non-financial corporations, 1999Q1-2013Q2 
A. Euro area (€ billions)      B. United Kingdom (₤ billions)  C: United States ($ billions) 
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Source: author’s calculations based on OECD 'Non-consolidated financial balance sheets by economic sector'. 
Note: quarterly balance sheet data. Debt securities correspond to 'Securities other than shares, excluding 
financial derivatives'. 
 
Credit growth has not yet resumed in most European countries, and credit is even declining in 
nominal terms in a number of countries. The declines in real terms are more significant. 
Clearly, economic growth and credit growth are simultaneous and it is not just that credit can 
drive the economy, but the reverse causality also exists. Economic growth can increase both 
credit demand (households and corporations are more willing to consume and invest when 
the economic outlook improves) and credit supply (economic growth improves bank balance 
sheets and thereby their ability to supply credit). But credit market conditions can also 
amplify shocks to the economy, as suggested for example by the financial accelerator theory 
(Bernanke et al. 1996).  
 
There is abundant academic research concluding that limitations in credit supply have played 
a major role in credit developments recently, as we will summarise in this article. Such 
supply constraints could hinder credit expansion even if higher credit demand returns. Given 
2 Since the debt securities market is accessible for large firms only, total debt liabilities of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) might not have increased, even in the US. 
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the prominent role of credit in the European economy and the limited substitution of bank 
loans with debt securities, one should be concerned about the consequences for economic 
growth. 
 
However, while economic theory predicts a close association between credit supply and the 
business cycle (Abiad et al. 2011), recent empirical literature has pointed out that there were 
a number of economic recoveries without credit growth, which are called ‘creditless 
recoveries’. Calvo et al. (2006a; b) were among the first to observe this phenomenon by 
studying a sample of emerging market economies after systemic sudden stops. They dubbed 
such developments ‘Phoenix miracles’ and showed that such recoveries are common, even 
though investment, a key driver of growth in normal times, remains weak in creditless 
recoveries. 
 
Subsequent research, such as Claesens et al. (2009a; b), International Monetary Fund (2009), 
Abiad et al. (2011), Bijsterbosch and Dahlhaus (2011), and Coricelli and Roland (2011), has 
looked at various other aspects of creditless (and also with-credit) recoveries. These studies 
have concluded that creditless recoveries are not rare events (they account for about every 
fifth recovery), but growth is about a third lower (i.e. 4.5 percent per year on average during 
the first three years of the recovery, as calculated by Abiad et al. 2011) than in recoveries 
with credit (when average growth was found to be 6.3 percent per year). Creditless recoveries 
are typically preceded by banking crises and sizeable output falls. Industries that are more 
reliant on external finance grow disproportionately less during creditless recoveries. Several 
papers also conclude that impaired financial intermediation and limited credit supply are the 
major reasons behind sluggish credit growth during creditless recoveries. 
 
Given this cautiously optimistic literature on the existence of creditless recoveries, it is 
relevant to ask if European economies could also expect to grow without credit in the coming 
years. This question also has a bearing on three current policy debates. One is the ongoing 
development of the European Banking Union, which, among others, aims to foster better 
access to finance. Another one is the development of specific instruments (beyond the 
banking union) to foster access to finance in the EU, and in particular to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). And a third related policy debate is on the targets and 
implementation speed of the Basel III requirements, since new capital, liquidity and leverage 
rules will likely impact on the ability of banks to supply credit to the economy.  
 
The goal of this article is to shed light on some less researched aspects of creditless 
recoveries: the role of exchange rate changes and financial development. After establishing 
some stylised facts using a sample of 135 countries and almost five decades of data, we 
assess the potential for creditless recoveries in Europe. 
 
 
2 Creditless recoveries in a historical perspective: a new look 
 
In our view, real exchange rate developments could play a major role in understanding 
creditless recoveries, yet the literature has not paid sufficient attention to this issue. While 
dummy variables indicating the existence of a currency crisis were included in some papers, 
this indicator does not capture the magnitude and persistence of exchange rate changes. In 
addition, exchange rates also changed in those cases that are not classified as currency crises. 
 
For example, Figure 2 shows that all four ‘true miracles’ identified by Abiad et al. (2011), i.e. 
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cases with exceptional high economic growth without cumulative real credit growth three 
years after the trough, were characterised by very large falls in the real exchange rate close to 
the GDP trough. 
 
Figure 2. Examples of credit-less recoveries, the four ‘true miracles’ (year of trough = 100) 
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Sources: author’s calculations using data listed in the data appendix. Note: real credit is credit to the private 
sector deflated using the consumer price index. REER = real effective exchange rate, which was calculated 
against 145 trading partners for Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay and against 99 trading partners for Chile using 
trade weights and consumer prices. 
 
In addition to bringing the real exchange rate into the analysis, we also include trade 
openness and financial development. Trade openness may have a bearing on the impact of the 
exchange rate on the economy, while financial development may directly impact the 
incidence of creditless recoveries. For example, economies in their financial infancy might 
not be much impacted by the availability or the lack of credit, but credit constraints could be 
disruptive when companies rely heavily on credit.3 
 
Sample 
Our sample includes annual data from 1960 for 135 countries for which data on output, credit 
and real effective exchange rate (REER) are available.4 We have excluded the period of the 
recent global crisis from the sample to search for recoveries (i.e. do not consider troughs 
during 2007-2012), but we use GDP data up to 2017 from the October 2012 forecast of the 
IMF in order to reduce the end-of-sample problem of the Hodrick-Prescott filter.5 We have 
excluded transition countries (up to the mid-1990s) and Middle Eastern oil exporting 
countries, since the transition was characterised by enormous structural changes and the 
economies of oil exporters substantially differ from the economies of EU countries. 
 
Definitions of business cycle trough and creditless recoveries 
Similarly to Braun and Larrain (2005), Abiad et al. (2011) and Bijsterbosch and Dahlhaus 
(2011), we define the trough of the business cycle as the lowest point of the cyclical 
3 Abiad et al. (2011) mention, incidentally, that creditless recoveries are more common in countries with less 
developed financial markets. 
4 We have checked 178 countries and the main bottleneck was the availability of credit data. 
5 The filter developed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) is a statistical method for decomposing a time series into 
trend and cyclical components. It is based on the assumption that the trend component is smooth and the 
smoothness can be set by altering a parameter. One problem with the filter is end-of-sample instability: when 
new observations are added, the estimated trend and cyclical components for the last few observations of the 
previous sample can change significantly. 
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component of real GDP identified by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 
6.25, which is the suggestion of Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data. We only consider 
those troughs for which the lowest point of the cyclical component is below zero by more 
than its standard deviation. The recovery period is defined as the first three years following 
the trough. We required at least four years between subsequent troughs. The recovery is 
defined as ‘creditless’ when the level of real credit stock (claims on private sector, IFS line 
32D6, deflated with the consumer price index) for three years after the trough is lower than in 
the year of trough.7 
 
The two main tables 
Table 1 shows some main characteristics of both creditless and with-credit recoveries. We 
report median values of the various indicators, because there are a number of outliers in our 
sample. Table 2 reports test statistics checking the significance of the difference between the 
median values of the indicators for creditless and with-credit recoveries. In addition to total, 
we report statistics for three income groups based on GDP per capita relative to the US in the 
trough year: below 10 percent, between 10 and 60 percent, and above 60 percent and 
hereafter call these groups low-income, middle-income and high-income, respectively. 
Currently, EU countries would belong to the middle- and high-income groups and therefore 
we focus on these groups.8 
 
Table 1. Some key characteristics of creditless and with-credit recoveries 
 
  Per capita income (% US) 
 
Type of 
recovery 
below 
10% 
between 
10% and 
60% 
above 
60% All 
Number of recoveries 
creditless 38 32 12 82 
with credit 112 152 82 346 
% creditless 25.3% 17.4% 12.8% 19.2% 
Median real GDP growth (average of three years after 
trough) 
creditless 4.8 4.7 3.2 4.5 
with credit 6.4 6.8 4.1 6.0 
Median real GDP growth of trading partners (average of 
three years after trough) 
credi-less 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 
with credit 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.8 
Median real GDP growth relative to growth of trading 
partners (average of three years after trough) 
creditless 1.2 1.2 -0.5 0.8 
with credit 2.7 2.7 -0.1 1.9 
Median credit (% GDP) creditless 15 30 50 27 
with credit 15 30 52 26 
Median current account adjustment (%GDP) credit-less 8.0 8.6 6.5 8.0 
with credit 5.5 5.7 3.0 4.6 
Median REER in 3 years after trough (%pre-trough credit-less 93 76 90 86 
6 As emphasised by Abiad et al. (2011), the IFS credit data has shortcomings: it does not include credit extended 
by non-bank financial intermediaries, and also does not include borrowing from abroad. But this is the only 
source with sufficient time and country coverage. 
7 Note that the Argentine and the Chilean episodes shown in Figure 2 just marginally pass this criterion. 
8 The level of a country’s development has a major bearing on growth drivers, see e.g. Veugelers (2011), 
justifying the focus on high- and middle-income countries when we wish to draw lessons for EU countries. 
Considering GDP per capita at PPP in 2013, as projected by the IMF October 2012 World Economic Outlook, 
Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal and all thirteen member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2013 would 
belong to the middle income middle-group. The other eleven EU member states would be in the high-income 
group. 
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peak) with credit 91 93 98 94 
Median openness (exports+imports, %GDP) credit-less 52 56 61 56 
with credit 54 80 62 63 
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
 
Table 2. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the equality of medians between the indicators 
creditless and with-credit recoveries 
 
 
Full sample Excluding low income countries  
 
Median real GDP growth (average of three years after trough) 4.21 3.21 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Median real GDP growth of trading partners (average of three 
years after trough) 
2.78 2.20 
(0.006) (0.028) 
Median real GDP growth relative to growth of trading 
partners (average of three years after trough) 
2.95 2.01 
(0.003) (0.044) 
Median credit (GDP %) 0.49 0.28 
(0.613) (0.777) 
Median current account adjustment (%GDP) 4.03 3.75 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Median REER in 3 years after trough (%pre-trough peak) 2.18 2.80 
(0.029) (0.005) 
Median openness (exports+imports, %GDP) 1.18 1.18 
(0.240) (0.239) 
 
Source: author’s calculations. Notes: p-values are in parentheses. Test statistics significant at 5 percent level are 
in italics. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test. 
 
 
Incidence of creditless recoveries 
There are 428 recoveries in our sample of which 82 are creditless, i.e. about every fifth 
recovery. The incidence of creditless recoveries is highest in low-income countries (25.3 
percent) and lowest in high-income countries (12.8 percent).9 In high-income countries, there 
were only 12 cases of creditless recoveries, the most recent in 1993, as indicated in Appendix 
2.10 
 
Growth 
Table 1 confirms the results from the literature that economic growth tends to be remarkable 
during the first three years of creditless recoveries (4.5 percent per year averaged across the 
full sample), even though it is less rapid than in recoveries with credit (6.0 percent). In high-
income countries, the median speed of economic growth during the first three years of 
creditless recoveries is also impressive, 3.2 percent per year, just below the 4.1 percent 
9 These results are consistent with the findings of Abiad et al. (2011), who analyse 362 recoveries. 
10 Note that we classify countries according to GDP per capita at PPP relative to the US in the year of trough, 
and therefore the twelve high-income countries with creditless recoveries also include the Bahamas in 1975 and 
Gabon in 1978 (see Appendix 2). 
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annual growth rate during recoveries with credit. 
 
Yet the GDP growth rate may not be the best indicator for assessing the speed of recovery, 
because the global growth environment likely has an impact. Table 1 shows that GDP growth 
of trading partners used to be somewhat faster in recoveries with credit, though the difference 
is not large. Growth relative to trading partners was 2.7 percent during with-credit recoveries 
in low- and middle-income countries, and 1.2 percent during creditless recoveries, which is 
still quite substantial. In high-income countries, the difference between growth relative to 
trading partners of the two types of recoveries is smaller. 
 
Financial development 
We measured financial development using the credit/GDP ratio, which is an imperfect 
measure, but the only one available for a large number of countries across several decades. 
The median of this indicator is practically identical for creditless and with-credit recoveries, 
and therefore within an income group, financial development does not seem to make a 
difference for the incidence of creditless recoveries. However, Table 1 also confirms that 
economic and financial developments correlate positively and we have already found that the 
incidence of creditless recoveries declines with the level of economic development. 
Therefore, we can also conclude that creditless recoveries are rare at a higher level of 
financial development, which is confirmed by Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Histogram of the credit/GDP ratios of the 82 creditless recoveries 
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Source: author’s calculations. 
Note: the four cases with more than 100 percent of GDP credit stock are Hong Kong in 1989 (169 percent), 
Malaysia in 1998 (156 percent), Thailand in 1998 (156 percent) and in Portugal 1975 (106 percent). In these 
cases the depreciation of the real exchange rate in three years after the trough compared to the pre-crisis peak 
was 8 percent, 16 percent, 58 percent and 18 percent, respectively. 
 
Current account  
Next, Table 1 indicates the magnitude of current account adjustment, which is defined as the 
difference between the maximum of current account/GDP positions during the three years 
after the trough, minus the minimum during the three years before the trough. Creditless 
recoveries are associated with greater current account adjustment, by about 3 percentage 
points of GDP, in all three income groups. 
 
 7 
Real exchange rate 
Current account adjustments are facilitated by adjustment in the real exchange rate. Table 1 
shows that all recoveries in all three income groups tended to be associated with lasting real 
effective exchange rate depreciations, and depreciations tended to be greater in creditless 
recoveries compared to with-credit recoveries, except in low-income countries. The 
difference in median cases of creditless and with-credit recoveries is significant (Table 2). In 
the middle-income countries, the median real effective depreciation is 24 percent from the 
pre-trough peak until three years after the trough in the creditless cases, and only seven 
percent in the with-credit cases. The same figures for high-income countries are 10 percent 
and two percent. And in several cases, part of the depreciation was corrected by the third year 
after the trough and therefore the maximum depreciation was even larger. 
 
However, while creditless recoveries tend to be accompanied by sizeable and durable real 
exchange rate depreciations, this is not always the case. Figure 4 indicates that the median 
real exchange rate clearly tends downward during creditless recoveries in middle-income 
countries, but the upper boundary of the interquartile range remains close to 100, implying 
that there was no depreciation in about every fourth creditless recovery. Among the high-
income countries, in two of the 12 cases the real exchange rate was at a higher level three 
years after the trough than the maximum before the trough.  
 
Figure 4. REER developments during creditless recoveries in middle- and high-income 
countries (pre-trough peak in REER = 100) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note. The pre-trough peak in real effective exchange rates occurred in different years (see also e.g. Figure 2: in 
trough minus one year in Argentina, in trough minus two years in Chile and Mexico, and in trough minus three 
years in Uruguay), and therefore the median is not equal 100 in any particular year before trough. The 75 
percent and the 25 percent refer to the first and third quartiles of the distribution of the REER developments (i.e. 
denote the boundaries of the interquartile range). 
 
Consequently, not all, but most, creditless recoveries are associated with sizeable and durable 
real exchange rate depreciations, and the median depreciation is significantly larger than the 
depreciation during recoveries with credit in middle- and high-income countries. 
 
Trade openness 
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Finally, we also checked if creditless recoveries emerged in countries more open to 
international trade, but this is not the case. If anything, countries with with-credit recoveries 
are somewhat more open (Table 1), but the difference is not significant (Table 2).  
 
3 Understanding creditless recoveries 
 
As Abiad et al. (2011) rightly argue, creditless recoveries are puzzling from a theoretical 
perspective. While Calvo et al. (2006a), and Biggs et al. (2009) sketch brief analytical 
models, it is fair to claim that comprehensive theoretical models have not been developed to 
understand creditless recoveries. Instead, authors studying such recoveries put forward 
certain hypotheses to explain them, as follows: 
 
• Absorption of idle capacities: creditless recoveries used to happen after deep recessions 
and thereby idle capacities are available for growth: firms could exploit these capacities 
without investing (e.g. Calvo et al. 2006a; b; Abiad et al. 2011; and Coricelli – Roland, 
2011);11 
• Role of liquidity: following a liquidity crunch, liquidity is restored by discontinuing 
investment projects, meaning that firms do not borrow (eg Calvo et al. 2006a; b); 
• Incorrect measurement of credit developments: the change in credit growth may matter 
more for output growth than credit growth itself. When, for example, credit falls sharply in 
the trough year, but credit growth stabilises in the next year (even if at a negative growth 
rate), then the change in credit growth is positive in the year after the trough, and that may 
help economic recovery (Biggs et al. 2009); 
• Alternative financing: firms can rely on alternative sources of financing, such as trade 
credit (e.g. Claessens et al., 2009; Coricelli – Roland, 2011); 
• Reallocation: a reallocation from more to less credit-intensive sectors takes place (e.g. 
Claessens et al., 2009; Abiad et al. 2011; Coricelli – Roland, 2011); 
• Strong external demand: disruptions to the supply of credit may not matter much for firms 
that are highly dependent on outside funding, if they produce goods that are highly tradable 
(IMF 2009). 
 
These explanations could all be valid to some extent, except perhaps the last one, because, as 
we found in Tables 1 and 2, GDP growth of trading partners tended to be faster in recoveries 
with credit. But our preceding analysis underlined that one more factor has to be added: 
 
• Real exchange rate depreciation: can help finance exporting firms via increased trade 
revenues. 
 
We cannot claim causality – that the weak real exchange rate causes output to recover when 
credit does not expand – because GDP growth, credit growth and the real exchange rate are 
endogenous variables and we do not have a well identified formal model to back us up. Yet 
the stylised fact we established suggests that economic growth may prove to be difficult in 
the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return. 
 
 
4 Implications for Europe 
11 The results of the probit model estimates of Bijsterbosch and Dahlhaus (2011) are consistent with this 
interpretation, since they find that among the statistically significant variables linked to the incidence of 
creditless recoveries, two variables, the preceding output fall and the occurrence of a banking crises, are 
economically significant. 
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Before the crisis, there was probably too much bank credit in several European countries. But 
the stock of bank loans (in nominal terms) at the end of 2012 was either similar to the 2008 
stock or even lower in all countries and areas indicated in Table 3. The only notable nominal 
increase can be observed in the seven Central and Eastern European countries outside the 
euro area (CEE7). But this is largely due to the revaluation effect of foreign currency loans, 
because currency exchange rates depreciated in Hungary, Poland and Romania, where 
foreign currency loans were widespread. In real terms, there was a fall in all areas and 
countries indicated in the table. 
 
Table 3: Loans to non-financial corporations measured in domestic currency (2008=100) 
 
    2000 2008 2012 
Euro area 17 nominal 55 100 99 
  real 66 100 91 
United Kingdom nominal 48 100 89 
 
real 56 100 78 
Denmark nominal 48 100 94 
  real 56 100 86 
Sweden nominal 46 100 100 
 
real 53 100 94 
CEE 7 nominal 33 100 110 
  real 45 100 95 
Source: author’s calculations using data from the ‘Financial balance sheets’ and ‘Harmonised indices of 
consumer prices’ databases of Eurostat.  
Note: CEE7 is the aggregate of the seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are not members of the 
euro area: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Consolidated data is 
used. 
 
 
Two major issues have to be discussed for the assessment of the potential for creditless 
recoveries in Europe: the role of supply and demand in credit contraction, and the potential 
for alternative source of financing beyond bank loans. 
 
Credit supply and demand 
The fall in credit aggregates could be related to both credit supply and credit demand, but 
also the writing-down of loans: 
 
• Credit supply: banks facing a deteriorating loan portfolio during a recession can tighten 
credit standards and reduce credit supply. New requirements for higher capital and 
liquidity ratios and lower leverage can also lead to a reduction of credit. 
• Credit demand: with the fall in output and increased uncertainty about the outlook, firms 
reduce their production and investment activities, and thereby reducing credit demand. 
Also, highly indebted firms may wish to deleverage during a downturn. 
• Write-downs: in a recession bankruptcies increase and banks suffer losses on their loan 
portfolios and write-down some claims, which also reduces the aggregate stock of loans. 
 
All three factors can play a role during creditless recoveries and from a policy perspective 
they have different implications. However, several research papers suggest that credit supply 
had a major role, both during earlier creditless recovery episodes and during the current 
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episode of sluggish credit development. 
 
Regarding earlier episodes, it was found that industries that are more dependent on external 
finance are hit harder during recessions (a finding corroborated by Braun – Larrain 2005) and 
these industries recover disproportionately less during a creditless recovery than those that 
are more self-financed (a finding of Abiad et al. 2011). When bank loans, debt securities and 
equity are not perfect substitutes, these findings suggest that impaired financial 
intermediation, and hence limitations in credit supply, was a major reason for past creditless 
recoveries. 
 
There is also abundant academic research concluding that recently, limited credit supply was 
an important factor in credit developments in several advanced economies. Hampell and 
Sorensen (2010) adopt a panel-econometric approach applied to a unique confidential dataset 
of results from the Eurosystem’s bank lending survey, and conclude that even after 
controlling for various demand-side factors, loan growth is negatively affected by supply-side 
constraints. Using a different technique – panel vector autoregression identified with sign 
restrictions – Hristov et al. (2012) find that that loan-supply shocks significantly contributed 
to the evolution of the loan volume and real GDP growth in euro-area member countries 
during the financial crisis. The role of credit supply is also corroborated by country-specific 
studies, for example for Italy by Del Giovane et al. (2012) and for Spain by Jiménez et al. 
(2012). 
 
Empirical results for non-euro area countries are similar. Aiyar (2011) looked at UK banks 
using detailed confidential balance sheet data reported to the Bank of England, and found that 
shocks to foreign funding caused a substantial pullback in domestic lending.  
 
Using US firm-level data, Becker and Ivashina (2011) interpret switching by firms from loans 
to bonds as a contraction in credit supply, conditional on the issuance of new debt. They find 
strong evidence of substitution of loans by bonds during periods characterised by tight 
lending standards, high levels of non-performing loans and loan allowances, low bank share 
prices and tight monetary policy. They also find that this substitution behaviour has 
predictive power for bank borrowing and investment of small (out-of-sample) firms, which 
are not able to issue bonds. In a related paper, Adrian et al. (2012) also document the shift 
from loans to bonds in the composition of credit in the US, and argue that the impact on real 
activity comes from the spike in risk premiums, rather than contraction in the total quantity of 
credit. Gertler (2012) adds, by sketching a simple conceptual framework, that credit spreads 
are a more useful indicator of credit supply disruptions than credit quantities. Gertler (2012) 
cites Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), who conclude that the increase in spreads during the 
recent financial crisis was likely symptomatic of unusual financial distress, and not just the 
reflection of the increased default risk faced by borrowers.12 
 
Certainly, the above-mentioned studies analysed data that was available at the time of writing 
and therefore their sample periods end between 2009 and 2011. Since then, a number of 
attempts were made by European governments and the European Central Bank to help restore 
normal lending and therefore the finding that credit supply was limited up to 2009 or 2011 
may not necessarily imply that such limitations exist now as well. However, European banks 
12 These authors argue that a credit supply disruption emerges when banks take losses on their loan portfolio, 
leading to large losses on their equity capital. Tightening of bank credits increases the demand for open market 
credit by non-financial firms, which, in conjunction with financial frictions, leads to an increase in open market 
interest rates as well. 
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still suffer from a large, €400 billion, capital shortfall according to the OECD (2013); the 
share of non-performing loans continues to be high; bank share prices are low even after the 
recent increases; and banks need to meet tight capital, liquidity and leverage requirements, 
even though some of the Basel III requirements were relaxed in January 2013 (Basel 
Committee 2013). These factors suggest that credit supply may remain constrained in the EU. 
 
Substitution of bank loans 
While there was notable substitution of bank loans with debt securities in the US, this was not 
really the case in continental Europe, as Figure 1 indicated for the aggregate of the euro 
area.13 Figure 5 shows the share of loans in debt liabilities of EU countries in 2008 and 2012. 
The country-specific evidence confirms the main message that the issuance of securities has 
hardly replaced loans in continental Europe. Note that since we are using balance sheet data, 
all kinds of loans, and not just loans from domestic banks, are included. 
 
Figure 5. The share of loans in debt liabilities of non-financial corporations in the EU, 2008 
and 2012 
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Source: Eurostat ‘Financial balance sheets’ database. 
Note: countries are ordered according to the share of loans in 2012. Consolidated data is used. 
 
Lack of substitution of bank loans with debt securities is a typical problem in bank-based 
economies, and likely has an implication for the speed of economic recovery. By studying 84 
recoveries in 17 OECD countries between 1960 and 2007, Allard and Balvy (2011) found 
that market-based economies experience significantly and durably stronger rebounds than the 
bank-based economies.14  
13 See Bijlsma and Zwart (2013) for a comprehensive account of the mega-trends of financial intermediation in 
Europe. 
14 However, they also found that stronger recoveries tend to be associated with greater economic flexibility. 
When employment and product market flexibility are taken into account, the comparative advantage of market-
 12 
                                            
 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
The literature on creditless recoveries is cautiously optimistic, concluding that while they are 
not optimal because of weak investment performance, they are not rare and the speed of 
recovery is still impressive. We also found, by studying historical episodes of economic 
recoveries in 135 countries during the past five decades, that average yearly real GDP growth 
during the first three years after the trough was 4.7 percent per year in middle-income 
countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries.15 Many European policymakers 
would probably be very happy if real GDP growth could reach such rates now. 
 
However, we have drawn a sceptical conclusion on the implications of the historical episodes 
of creditless recoveries for current European circumstances, for two major reasons.  
 
First, the incidence of creditless recoveries is much lower in high-income countries, which 
are characterised by high levels of financial development, than in low-income countries in 
their financial infancy. Since most European countries heavily depend on bank loans, credit 
constraints could be disruptive. Also, in contrast to the US, where the issuance of debt 
securities compensated for the withdrawal of bank loans, there has been rather limited 
substitution in continental Europe.  
 
Furthermore, the issuance of debt securities is not an option for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), which play a crucial role in economic growth and employment. OECD 
(2012) showed that during the recent credit crunch, SMEs were harder hit than big firms and 
faced more severe lending conditions. Access to finance thus remains vital for the creation, 
growth and survival of SMEs. But previous European initiatives were able to support only a 
tiny fraction of Europe’s SMEs; merely stepping-up these programmes is unlikely to result in 
a break-through. Without repairing bank balance sheets and resuming economic growth, 
initiatives to help SMEs get access to finance will have limited success. The European 
Central Bank can foster bank recapitalisation by performing in the toughest possible way the 
Comprehensive Assessment of banks it has to do before it takes over the single supervisory 
role. Of the possible initiatives for fostering SME access to finance, a properly designed 
scheme for targeted central bank lending seems to be the best complement to the banking 
clean-up, as argued by Darvas (2013). 
 
Second, during historical episodes of creditless recoveries, exchange rate depreciation have 
likely played a role by increasing revenues from foreign trade, which could have supported 
company financing when access to credit was limited. We found that while both creditless 
and with-credit recoveries tend to be associated with real exchange rate depreciation, the 
depreciation was significantly larger and more persistent during creditless recoveries. In 
middle-income countries, the median depreciation of the consumer price index-based REER 
from the pre-crisis peak to three years after the trough was 24 percent, but during with-credit 
recoveries it was 7 percent. In high-income countries, the same numbers are 10 percent 
based economies in recoveries is less significant and therefore it is difficult to claim causality. 
15 These growth rates are high even though they are lower than growth during recoveries with credit. Also, when 
looking at growth relative to the growth of trading partners, creditless recoveries were less speedy than growth 
during recoveries with credit, yet still impressive: there was a 1.2 percent extra growth relative to trading 
partners in middle income countries and a 0.5 percent growth shortfall relative to trading partners in high 
income countries. 
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(creditless) and 2 percent (with-credit).  
 
Since the current global financial and economic crisis erupted, the depreciation in most euro-
area countries fell short of these benchmarks. In Ireland, a high-income country, the 15 
percent depreciation from pre-crisis peak to 2012 was greater than the benchmark, and the 
depreciations in Germany (9 percent), the Netherlands (8 percent), Finland (8 percent) and 
France (8 percent) are not far from it. But the depreciations in Italy (6 percent), Spain (5 
percent), Portugal (5 percent) and Greece (4 percent) are far below the benchmark for the 
middle-income country group, ie the group to which they belong.16 Unfortunately, these 
southern European countries are also those that experience sizeable contractions in the 
outstanding stock of bank loans to non-financial corporations and therefore they face the 
double challenge of limited real exchange rate depreciation and sizeable contraction in 
credit.17 
 
We did not set up a causal model and hence cannot claim that the real exchange rate 
depreciation was a cause of creditless recoveries, because GDP growth, credit growth and the 
real exchange rate are endogenous variables. Yet the stylised facts we established suggest that 
if credit growth does not return, economic recovery may prove to be difficult in the absence 
of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation. 
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APPENDIX 1: DATA SOURCES FOR THE CALCULATIONS IN SECTION 2 
 
GDP: GDP at constant prices is from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) October 
2012 for 1980-2017 (when available). Missing data and earlier data was chained to the WEO 
data from IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank World Development Indicators 
(WDI), EBRD and the Maddison dataset. 
 
GDP of trading partners: for each country we calculated the weighted average of real GDP 
growth of trading partners, using country-specific weights derived on the basis of Bayoumi, 
Lee and Jaewoo (2006). Due to missing data (mostly for transition economies before 1990), 
we calculated two indices: one using GDP data of 145 countries, which is available form 
1960, and another one using GDP data of 175 countries for recoveries in 1993 and later. 
 
GDP per capita at PPP (purchasing power parity) relative to the United States: the main 
source of GDP per capita at PPP is the October 2012 IMF WEO, which includes data for 
1980-2017 with some gaps for some countries. The figures relative to the U.S. were 
calculated from this database for 1980-2017. Missing values during from 1980, and values 
before 1980, were approximated by calculating the change in real GDP per capita relative to 
the US and chaining this ratio to the most recent data available on relative GDP per capita at 
PPP in the IMF WEO. Real GDP growth rates are from the sources described above, while 
population data is from World Bank WDI. 
 
Credit: ‘Claims on private sector’, line 32D, from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
Credit/GDP: nominal credit divided by nominal GDP, which is from the IMF World 
Economic outlook October 2012 and IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
Real credit: nominal credit deflated by the consumer price index, which is from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics. 
 
Real effective exchange rate: updated database of Darvas (2012a). Due to missing data, we 
have calculated the real effective exchange rate against four different country groups: against 
172 countries for 1993-2012, against 145 countries for 1980-2012, against 99 countries for 
1970-2012 and against 67 countries for 1960-2012. For each case of recovery, we use the 
broadest available REER. 
 
Exports and Imports (% GDP): for most countries, data is available in the IMF International 
Financial Statistics for all three variables (exports of goods and services, imports of goods 
and services, and GDP; all are at current prices). Missing data for exports and imports were 
filled from UNCTAD. 
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF CREDITLESS RECOVERIES 
 
High income 
countries  
Middle income 
countries  Low income countries 
Norway 1990  Greece 1987  Guyana 1990 
United States 1991  Barbados 1973  Congo, Rep. 1987 
Denmark 1975  Gabon 1987  Philippines 1985 
France 1993  Portugal 1986  Ivory Coast 1984 
Italy 1993  Portugal 1975  Indonesia 1998 
Hong Kong 1998  Mexico 1983  Sri Lanka 1989 
Sweden 1993  
Trinidad and Tobago 
1984  Djibouti 1996 
United Kingdom 1975  Jamaica 1976  Madagascar 1973 
Bahamas 1975  Mexico 1995  Senegal 1983 
Gabon 1978  Malta 1974  Ghana 1976 
Finland 1993  Malaysia 1998  Papua New Guinea 1997 
Iceland 1961  Argentina 1990  Ivory Coast 1992 
  Brazil 1992  Cameroon 1994 
  Argentina 2002  Papua New Guinea 1990 
  Uruguay 1985  Niger 1969 
  Botswana 1994  Pakistan 1972 
  Uruguay 2002  Nigeria 1987 
  Suriname 1993  Tanzania 1965 
  Chile 1983  Tanzania 1969 
  Ecuador 1983  Sierra Leone 1992 
  Colombia 1985  Tanzania 1974 
  Guyana 1973  Comoros 1991 
  Paraguay 1983  Benin 1989 
  Colombia 1999  
Central African Republic 
1983 
  Tonga 1989  Zambia 1995 
  Ecuador 1987  Guinea Bissau 1998 
  Thailand 1998  Mali 1978 
  Ecuador 1999  Haiti 2004 
  Botswana 1977  Togo 1993 
  Paraguay 2002  Uganda 1980 
  Belize 1982  Tanzania 1994 
  Western Samoa 1991  Malawi 1981 
    Burkina Faso 1990 
    Burundi 1980 
    Sierra Leone 1997 
    Sudan 1985 
    Sudan 1996 
    Malawi 1994 
Note: the cases are ordered according to GDP per capita in the year of trough. 
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